We spend an extraordinary amount of political energy arguing about how to manage the economy. Should taxes rise or fall? Should the government borrow more or less? Should we regulate or deregulate? But underneath these arguments there is a more fundamental question that we rarely ask:
What is the purpose of the economy?
By “purpose”, I mean the consequences that its rules, incentives and concentrations of power systematically organise it to reproduce. What outcomes does it produce? What does it accomplish?
Many people today don’t even realise that this is a question we can debate. The economy is often spoken about as though it is something external to society, like the weather — an impersonal force to which we must adapt. But economies are human systems. Their institutions, laws, and incentives have evolved over centuries, shaped by successive struggles over resources and political power. As such, if we want to change economic outcomes, we must first understand what the economy we inherited has been historically organised to do.
Take the Roman Empire as a case study. Its coinage was a state-issued medium of exchange, enabling transactions within the economy to contain a dual purpose: at the individual level, trade enabled the exchange of items of value, while at the state level it provided revenue to the empire through taxation. What, then, was the purpose of the empire? One of its recurring outcomes, as directed by its emperors, was to bring additional territory and taxpayers under Roman control, enriching and empowering the imperial state and its elites.
The nation states we live in today evolved from the states of the past, whose ruling classes themselves inherited power structures and institutions from their predecessors. They faced pressures to expand and defend their own power, over both neighbouring states and their own populations. For understanding the modern economy, the British Empire was perhaps the most influential of those precursor states.
During the feudal era, the English nobility and royal family largely determined the economic activities within society, gaining this power from control of the limited supply of productive land. As landed gentry and merchant classes increased in political and economic influence, this establishment was challenged. Controlling trade became more important than land at home, and so economic power increasingly extended from the old aristocracy to merchants, guilds and corporations; only those who adapted to the new balance of power, taking on businesses of their own, maintained their family wealth to the present day.
During the Industrial Revolution, the ruling, property-owning class continued to direct the economy towards its own ends through its exclusive right to elect members of Parliament; even the 1832 Reform Act left the majority of men – and all women – without the vote. Parliament served the interests of those with wealth primarily through economic growth, territorial expansion, and resource extraction. Here in the UK, that was experienced by the working classes as the enclosure and privatisation of land (6.8 million acres between 1604 and 1914), industrial child labour, and ruthless state crackdowns on strikes.
Meanwhile, in the colonies, the British Empire exported its social and economic arrangement to roughly a quarter of the Earth’s land area and population. Whether through Caribbean cash crop plantations powered by slave labour in the 18th century or using hut and poll taxes to coerce colonial subjects to sell their labour in South Africa and Uganda in the 19th and 20th centuries, the logic of the economic system was the same. During the Pax Britannica, Britain dominated the global economy, but the same arrangement was adopted by other colonial powers; the purpose of the economy in this era — the outcome it reliably produced — was wealth extraction from the lower socioeconomic classes (both at home and abroad) to concentrate power for those at the top.
After the bloodshed and political turmoil of the First World War, the Soviet Union tried to elucidate a different purpose: one where the economy served all its participants as equals. But this collapsed under its own contradictions. Michels’s iron law of oligarchy — that every organisation requires centralised leadership, and the incentives acting upon its leaders divorce their interests from those of the organisation as a whole, thus incentivising the creation of oligarchy — exposed a fundamental vulnerability in a state that attempted to enforce an egalitarian economy from the top down through a supreme centralised authority. The same logic governing the leaders of capitalist states applied no less to the communists.
After the horrors of the Second World War, with the preceding Great Depression still fresh in collective memories, social democracy appeared to offer the possibility of something different. The post-war consensus was established, with the Attlee government’s creation of the modern welfare state and nationalisation of core economic sectors from railways to the Bank of England.
However, by this point Britain was in decline, and the USA ascended to superpower status after diverting its enormous productive capacity to win the war. It was then faced with a decision: what to do with the old extractive colonial economic order? At the Bretton Woods conference, where the seeds of the post-war economic architecture were established, Keynes proposed an International Clearing Union and a genuinely international reserve currency, the bancor; instead, the US made the same rational choice that powerful states have made countless times throughout history and placed itself — and the dollar — at the centre of the new monetary system.
Unlike Britain’s largely territorial empire, US power during the Pax Americana has operated primarily through alliances, international institutions, trade and finance. Nevertheless, force has often been exercised to protect or advance US strategic interests through intimidation or outright regime change, and in so doing maintaining the US-led extractive status quo; the coups d’état in Iran and Guatemala in the 1950s and the capture of Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela earlier this year are notable examples.
With the implementation of neoliberal reforms under Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, the globalisation of business and supply chains, and the weakening of both unions and democratic power over corporate sovereignty, we find ourselves in a world with an increasing alignment between the rich and powerful of every nation under the umbrella of American influence.
And so, to pose the question again: what is the purpose of the economy today in the global order established by the US? Just as it was during the Roman Empire, feudal Europe, or the British Empire, the enduring purpose of the economy – at the systemic level – is to concentrate power in the hands of the rich and powerful. Neoliberal ideology helped entrench shareholder primacy as a dominant corporate governance paradigm, encouraging the world’s most powerful economic actors to maximise value to shareholders as their primary purpose; in other words, to provide increasing wealth to those who are already wealthy enough to own slices of yielding assets.
Instead of emperors and kings, the richest and most powerful people are now billionaires: multinational business owners, investors and financiers. And while this is preferable to the economic settlement under feudalism, their power over the modern economy — where capital flows, and where it doesn’t — still provides them outsized influence over its overall purpose and direction compared to those of us with smaller wallets.
The problems with this existing model are becoming increasingly clear. Here in the UK, wealth remains highly concentrated. Excessive market power and rent-seeking is stifling innovation and suppressing growth, just as in the first Gilded Age. The economic incentives for polluting industries are contributing to the accelerating climate crisis and geopolitical instability. And when capital is globally mobile, it can easily avoid its territorially bounded public obligations, creating a race to the bottom for legislators.
It may be profitable to extract wealth from the working classes in the short term, but once the association between hard work and a good quality of life is broken, once people stop expecting their children to be better off than they are, faith is lost in the social contract. The resulting social unrest is now providing fertile ground for opportunistic authoritarian capture of democratic states by a particular subset of extractive elites who no longer believe that democracy is compatible with their freedom to exercise unchecked power.
What, then, is our alternative to the continuation of the global system based on extraction and widening inequality? The economy cannot be organised around the concentration of wealth without struggling to serve the needs of the many. Nor can it primarily grow through resource extraction while addressing catastrophe-inducing climate change.
Andy Burnham is right to identify neoliberalism as one of the primary causes of the social and economic malaise felt in the UK, and a key feature of neoliberalism has been the attempt to insulate elements of economic decision making from democratic politics. So if we are to move beyond the neoliberal era, and redefine what progressivism means in the context of the 21st century and its overlapping crises, we must first answer the unresolved question: what should the purpose of the economy be?
If you were designing the global economy from first principles, instead of accepting the path it took while evolving from feudalism, what outcomes would you want it to achieve? To prioritise individual freedom, even if doing so provides the powerful with increasing control over everyone else? To prioritise giving every member of society equal opportunity to succeed, even if it means altering the traditional social fabric? To maintain regenerative balance with the natural environment, even if it means reducing economic growth? To provide the societal basics — healthcare, education, social care — out of the collective purse, even if it means making us less globally competitive?
As a democracy, this question ought to be one for us collectively decide. Economic institutions are historically contingent, yes, and they typically embody the priorities of influential groups within society. Historically, this has privileged concentrations of power. But we are entitled to debate those priorities rather than treating the existing settlement as natural or inevitable.
Once a defined purpose is crystallised and capable of being articulated, it becomes possible to embed it in law; Wales’s Well-being of Future Generations Act demonstrates this possibility, giving public bodies legally binding goals and duties around economic, social, environmental and cultural wellbeing.
This will no doubt be a debate where many people have contrasting thoughts and ideas. There will be disagreements. And some politicians will inevitably continue to disguise their true beliefs and intentions. But if we do not open the space for this type of discussion in our politics, we risk ceding control over the post-neoliberal economic model to an increasingly well-funded and internationally networked far-right.
Of course, in a globalised economy, we do not act in a vacuum. While the US remains the world’s largest economy by GDP, China plays a significant role in shaping tomorrow’s global order in today’s increasingly multipolar world. China’s extensive history contains many instructive examples of state collapse and subsequent institutional reformation, such as the transition from Yuan to popular Ming rule. But any dominant state faces incentives to shape international rules in its own interests, and China’s successful cornering of battery supply chains make it clear that they are comfortable placing themselves at the centre of the global economy.
So if we are truly to decide collectively what the economy should be for, what its outcomes should be, it will also require international cooperation on a scale that is currently in short supply. Finding agreement across so many cultures and differing interests is a Herculean task. But a better world is still possible.
However, if we fail to come to a collective decision, history will decide for us. And in an age of increasing climate-related costs, open warfare, widespread global displacement of people, state surveillance, and AI-induced disruption to global markets, inaction may be fatal for the hope of building a brighter future.
If democracy is to mean anything more than holding elections every five years, then we must agree on the answer to this most pressing of questions:
What should the purpose of the economy be?
Nicholas Moore is a writer, strategist and communications consultant exploring the intersection of politics, economics and institutional transformation. Currently studying an interdisciplinary MBA at the London Interdisciplinary School, he is interested in applying insights from complexity science to policymaking, strategic decision-making and democratic renewal. You can find his Substack here.